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In this article, I argue that depression and suicide are natural kinds insofar as they are classes of 
abnormal behavior underwritten by sets of stable biological mechanisms. In particular, 
depression and suicide are neurobiological kinds characterized by disturbances in serotonin 
functioning that affect various brain areas (i.e., the amygdala, anterior cingulate, prefrontal 
cortex, and hippocampus). The significance of this argument is that the natural (biological) basis 
of depression and suicide allows for reliable projectable inferences (i.e., predictions) to be made 
about individual members of a kind. In the context of assisted suicide, inferences about the 
decision-making capacity of depressed individuals seeking physician-assisted suicide are of 
special interest. I examine evidence that depression can hamper the decision-making capacity of 















What kind of thing is classified by the term ‘suicide’? Is it a medical condition? Or is 
suicide better understood as a social (or socially constructed) phenomenon? This article 
addresses these questions by focusing on the question of whether depression and suicide are 
natural kinds. I subsequently examine what bearing these issues regarding the naturalness of 
suicide have on the thorny issue of assisted suicide.  
A high proportion of patients who request physician-assisted suicide are suffering from 
depression or present depressive symptoms (Levene & Parker, 2011). This circumstance raises 
important questions about how depression affects individuals’ judgments about ending their 
lives, and in particular, whether depression hampers individuals’ capacity to make competent 
decisions about assisted suicide. Moreover, the high prevalence of depression among individuals 
seeking physician-assisted suicide highlights the importance of issues regarding the specific 
ways in which depression can alter patients’ decision-making process and the extent to which the 
kinds of depression that are a precursor to suicide are treatable. 
The article proceeds as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I examine questions concerning the 
naturalness of depression and suicide. In section 2, I critically examine the views of Thomas 
Szasz and Ian Hacking who offer different reasons for rejecting the existence of natural kinds in 
psychiatry. I subsequently propose a positive theoretical account of natural kinds in psychiatry 
that maintains that some mental disorders are natural kinds insofar as members of a kind share 
the same biological causal structure. More specifically, natural kinds in psychiatry (e.g., 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) are stable objects of classification whose characteristic signs are 
determined by networks of stable biological mechanisms. Analyses of Szasz and Hacking fail to 
establish that these natural kinds (i.e., mechanistic property cluster kinds) do not exist. In section 
3, I argue that depression and suicide are natural kinds because they are classes of abnormal 
behavior associated with serotonin dysfunction in various brain structures (i.e., the amygdala, 
anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus). In section 4, I consider the implications 
of this analysis for assisted suicide. My focus is on questions concerning the extent that 
depression hampers individuals’ capacity to make sound decisions and the potential to treat more 
severe forms of depression.  
 
2. Natural kinds in psychiatry   
In philosophy of science, the distinction between natural kinds and artificial kinds refers 
to a distinction between kinds (or classes) of things that are discovered and invented respectively 
(see Bird & Tobin, 2010). Natural kinds are classes of naturally occurring objects, properties, or 
processes that exist independent of and are discovered by classifiers (e.g., electrons, gold, H20, 
fish). By contrast, artificial kinds are classes of objects that are imposed on nature and invented 
by classifiers (e.g., chairs, paperweights, toys, games). Hence, natural kinds are thought to be 
naturally occurring (‘real’) phenomena that are the proper objects of scientific study (e.g., 
fundamental particles in physics, elements in chemistry, and species in biology); artificial kinds, 
by contrast, are arbitrary or invented classes that serve some useful social function for classifiers, 
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but do not have a natural basis.1 In examining natural kinds in psychiatry, I am especially 
interested in the kinds of objects that are individuated by human science classifications. While 
some human science classifications (e.g., ‘introversion,’ ‘puberty,’ ‘breast cancer,’ ‘HIV’) 
individuate classes of people in terms of a discoverable natural property or set of natural 
properties, other classifications (e.g., ‘policemen,’ ‘liberals,’ ‘spouse,’ ‘widows’) individuate 
groups of people in terms of purely conventional properties, i.e., properties that do not 
necessarily have a natural basis, but are convenient for distinguishing a social group.  
 
2.1. Skeptics of natural kinds in psychiatry 
Thomas Szasz (1960, 1974) has argued that the objects classified in psychiatry (‘mental 
illnesses’) do not refer to natural kinds that are discovered, but artificial kinds that are invented. 
He argues that ‘mental illness’ is a term that—in reality—refers to problems in living (i.e., the 
undesirable thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals). Within this theoretical framework, 
Szasz draws a distinction between bodily illnesses (which are natural kinds) and mental illnesses 
(which are artificial kinds). As Szasz (1998) puts it: 
Mental illness is a metaphor (metaphorical disease). The word “disease” denotes a 
demonstrable biological process that affects the bodies of living organisms (plants, 
animals, and humans). The term “mental illness” refers to the undesirable thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors of persons. Classifying thoughts, feelings, and behaviors as 
diseases is a logical and semantic error. (Szasz 1998, emphasis added) 
Szasz’s analysis draws a strict distinction between bodily illnesses (which are objectively 
determined and matters of fact) and mental illnesses (which are subjectively determined and 
social inventions). According to this view, ‘mental illness’ refers to thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors that are disapproved of by society (not thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are 
caused by pathological biological processes). For Szasz (1960), this state-of-affairs marks a 
significant difference in the logic of bodily illness and mental illness: 
The concept of illness, whether bodily or mental, implies deviation from some clearly 
defined norm. In the case of physical illness, the norm is the structural and functional 
integrity of the human body. . . . [W]hat health is can be stated in anatomical and 
physiological terms. What is the norm deviation from which is regarded as mental 
illness? . . .  [W]hatever this norm might be, we can be certain . . . that it is a norm that 
must be stated in terms of psycho-social, ethical, and legal concepts.  (p. 114, emphasis 
in original) 
Szasz’s rationale for rejecting natural kinds in psychiatry is premised on the idea that the relevant 
norms for determining mental illnesses—as opposed to bodily illnesses—are social rather than 
natural (i.e., biological). 
In an analysis that also appeals to the social aspects of psychiatry, Ian Hacking (1999, ch. 
4) has argued that the objects of classification in psychiatry are ‘human kinds’ (or ‘interactive 
                                                          
1 While some artificial kinds may have a natural basis, this basis is typically not the scientifically interesting (i.e., 
law-like) type of natural basis characteristic of natural kinds. Conversely, all natural kinds are artificial insofar as 
they are classes (e.g., species, race) individuated relative to various human interests. In section 2.2 of this article, I 
suggest that the distinction between natural and artificial kinds is best understood as a distinction in degree (cf. 
Dupré, 1981, 1993, 2001, 2002; LaPorte, 2004). 
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kinds’) that are fundamentally different from the natural kinds studied in the natural sciences. 
According to Hacking, most objects of classification in the human sciences—in contrast to 
objects of classification in the natural sciences—are inherently unstable objects of classification 
because of the ‘looping effects of human kinds’ (Hacking, 1986, 1995, 2007a). Looping effects 
are social feedback effects of human science classifications, wherein the meaning of a 
classification (e.g., ‘depression,’ ‘homosexuality,’ ‘multiple personality’) can affect and change 
the experiences and behavior of people who are so classified (e.g., an individual diagnosed with 
depression acts in accordance with the expectations and stereotypes associated with the 
depression label). Because the objects of classification in the social sciences—unlike those in the 
natural sciences—are aware of how they are classified and will change in response to how they 
are classified (in unpredictable ways), Hacking maintains that the objects of study in the human 
sciences are inherently unstable. As Hacking (1999) puts it: “The targets of the natural sciences 
are stationary. Because of looping effects, the targets of the social sciences are on the move” (p. 
108, emphasis added). More recently, Hacking (2007a) has articulated this idea as follows: 
We think of . . . kinds of people [e.g., obese people or impoverished people] . . . as 
definite classes defined by definite properties [i.e., natural kinds]. . . . But it is not quite 
like that. They are moving targets because our investigations interact with the targets 
themselves, and change them. And since they are changed, they are not quite the same 
kind of people as before. The target has moved. That is the looping effect. (p. 293, 
emphasis added) 
Here, Hacking makes the radical suggestion that—because of looping effects—the objects of 
human science classifications (i.e., kinds of people) are perpetually unstable entities. The idea is 
that because classifications in the human sciences causally affect the people being classified, the 
classified people will constantly be changing (and their associated classifications will need to be 
constantly revised in order to accommodate such changes). This is the sense in which Hacking 
maintains that the objects of classification in the human sciences are not natural kinds.  
The arguments presented by Szasz and Hacking do not preclude the existence of natural 
kinds in psychiatry. With respect to Szasz, it is clear that his analysis does not present a fair 
formulation of what mental illness is. Recall Szasz’s claims that: 
(1) ‘bodily illness’ refers to a demonstrable biological process that affects the bodies of 
living organisms.  
(2) ‘mental illness’ refers to the undesirable thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of persons.  
 
Szasz’s analysis clearly equivocates on what ‘illness’ means. In the formulation above, ‘mental 
illness’ refers to the symptoms (or characteristic signs) of mental illness in (2), whereas ‘bodily 
illness’ refers to the cause of symptoms in (1). On a more consistent and charitable rendering, 
Szasz would be obligated to claim that: 
(1) ‘bodily illness’ refers to a demonstrable biological process that affects the bodies of 
living organisms.  
(2*) ‘mental illness’ refers to a demonstrable biological process that affects the thoughts,             
      feelings, and behaviors of persons.  
  
I submit that some mental disorders are natural kinds as formulated in (2*) insofar as there is 
good evidence that the symptoms of some disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
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depression) are caused by demonstrable biological processes.2 Moreover, as others have pointed 
out (e.g., see Boorse, 1976; Kendall, 1975; Sedgwick, 1982), Szasz’s argument ultimately hinges 
on an untenable distinction between bodily illness and mental illness. Szasz presupposes an 
unrealistic view, in which physical illnesses are determined in an objective and value-free 
manner (while mental illnesses are not). It is clear, however, that all attributions of illness (both 
physical and mental) require the normative value-judgment that a condition is harmful or 
undesirable (e.g., because it compromises an individual’s ability to survive or lead an otherwise 
normal life).3 If one assumes a more nuanced view of bodily illness (which also require value 
judgments), then there is no principled difference in the determination of bodily and mental 
illness. The determination of any illness requires both the presence of a demonstrable biological 
process (which is natural) and the value-judgment that the effects of that process are harmful 
(which is social).4 What makes an illness a natural kind is the presence of a demonstrable 
biological process.  
With respect to Hacking’s analysis, the putative existence of looping effects does not 
necessarily compromise the stability of objects of psychiatric classification (Tsou, 2007). 
Looping effects are a ubiquitous feature of most human science classifications. For looping 
effects to render an object of classification unstable in the way suggested by Hacking, however, 
something very specific needs to occur. Looping effects must change the experiences and 
behavior of individuals who fall under a classification in a uniform manner. Moreover, a 
sufficient number of individuals need to be uniformly changed by looping effects such that the 
criteria that constitute membership for that classification must be revised. Although these drastic 
kinds of consequences of looping effects do sometimes occur, more often than not, the 
consequences of looping effects are much more innocuous. On this view, mental disorders that 
are natural kinds remain stable in spite of looping effects. This follows from the fact that 
members of a kind share a similar biological causal structure, which ensures that the 
characteristic signs of such disorders remain stable over time.  
 
                                                          
2 In this article, the relevant demonstrable biological processes in both physical and mental illness are 
conceptualized to be dysfunctional biological processes that deviate from species-typical normal functioning (see 
Boorse, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1997; Daniels, 1981, 1985, 2008).   
3 Peter Sedgwick (1982) expresses this complaint aptly as follows:  
[T]here is no reason to believe that the ‘standardized’ varieties of human pathology [i.e., physical illnesses] 
operate to a different logic from ‘culturally’ dependent varieties [e.g., mental illnesses]. The existence of 
common or even universal illnesses testifies, not to the absence of a normative framework for judging 
pathology, but to the presence of very wide-spread norms . . . The attribution of illness always proceeds 
from the computation of a gap between presented behavior (or feeling) and some social norm. (pp. 33-34, 
emphasis added) 
4 The reason why there appears to be a fundamental difference between bodily and mental illnesses is because there 
is greater disagreement over whether the effects of mental illnesses are harmful. While most bodily illnesses (e.g., 
cancer, tuberculosis) are clearly harmful because they compromise an individual’s ability to survive or lead a normal 
life, the harmful effects of some mental disorders listed in the DSM (e.g., ADHD, male erectile disorder) are much 
more controversial. For these more controversial disorders, the ideal that is implicitly being contrasted with harm is 
optimality, rather than normality. As a more conservative criterion (see Boorse, 1977), one could stipulate that 
genuine illnesses are interferences with normal biological functioning that are harmful insofar as they compromise 
an individual’s capacity to lead a normal unimpeded life. On this view, the ideal that is contrasted with illness is not 
optimal health, but normal health. 
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2.2. Some mental disorders are mechanistic property cluster kinds 
Among the various mental disorders listed in the DSM (APA, 2000), some disorders are 
more natural than others.5 From this perspective, natural kinds in psychiatry are objects of 
classification that are associated with a predictable (natural) biological basis, as opposed to 
objects of classification that do not. In the following section, I articulate a theoretical account of 
natural kinds in psychiatry, which draws upon Richard Boyd’s account of homeostatic property 
cluster (HPC) kinds. 
In offering a theoretical account of mental disorders as natural kinds, I assume that the 
distinction between natural kinds and artificial kinds is best understood as a distinction of degree, 
not a distinction of kind (see LaPorte, 2004, pp. 20-27). Psychiatric classifications—like all 
scientific classifications—are inevitably theory-laden (and thus conventional) since they are 
formulated relative to certain human values, interests, and standpoints. However, this theory-
ladeness does not vitiate the fact that some classifications will pick out classes that are more 
natural than others (cf. Slater, 2005).6 I examine classes of abnormal behavior that fall on the 
‘more natural’ end of the natural-artificial spectrum insofar as these classes can—to a large 
extent—be individuated in terms of a set of natural properties. 
The biological mechanisms that underwrite a cluster of abnormal behaviors and 
psychological processes establish some mental disorders as natural kinds because members of 
these kinds share a similar biological causal structure. This perspective draws on Richard 
Boyd’s (1991, 1999) homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theory of natural kinds, which defines 
HPC kinds in terms of the following  characteristics (see Boyd, 1988, p. 197; 1989, pp. 16-17; 
1990, pp. 373-374; 1999, pp. 143-144): 
(1) There is a family (F) of properties that are contingently clustered in nature. 
(2) Their co-occurrence is the result of what may be (metaphorically or literally) 
described as homeostasis; either the presence of some properties tends to favor the 
presence of others, or there are underlying mechanisms that tend to maintain the 
properties in F, or both. 
(3) There is a kind term (t) that is applied to things in which the homeostatic clustering of 
most of the properties in F occurs. 
                                                          
5 Zachar (2000) argues that no psychiatric disorders are natural kinds and that all psychiatric disorders are ‘practical 
kinds.’ This stance is unreasonable insofar as it assumes (like Szasz) that all the disorders listed in DSM fall under a 
single monolithic category (cf. Haslam, 2002). Zachar’s idea of ‘practical kinds’ (viz., stable patterns that can be 
identified with varying levels of reliability and validity) is also too vaguely formulated to be useful. 
6 In response to the murkiness of the natural kind concept, Hacking (2007b) argues that: “Some classifications are 
more natural than others, but there is no such thing as a natural kind” (p. 203, emphasis in original). This defeatist 
attitude, however, is not the only response one can make. As Hacking acknowledges, another way of facing this 
murkiness is to adopt what John Dupré (1993, 2001, 2002) calls ‘promiscuous’ or ‘pluralistic’ realism. Dupré (1981) 
describes this position as follows: “The realism derives from the fact that there are many sameness relations that 
serve to distinguish classes . . . in ways that are relevant to various concerns; the promiscuity derives from the fact 
that none of these relations is privileged” (p. 82, emphasis added). On this view, there are many classifications 
that—given different human interests—yield classes that merit the label of natural kinds. The stance on natural kinds 
adopted in this article follows Dupré’s pluralistic approach; in Hacking’s terminology, I am interested in psychiatric 
disorders that fall on the ‘more natural’ end of the classification spectrum. 
7 
 
Boyd’s HPC theory offers a useful account of how members of psychiatric kinds share the same 
biological causal structure (see Beebee & Sabbarton-Leary, 2010; Cooper, 2005, ch. 2, 2007, ch. 
4; Murphy, 2006, ch. 9). Within this framework, the characteristic signs of a mental disorder can 
be understood as the cluster of properties (F), while its biological causes are the mechanisms 
referred to in (2) that tend to maintain these properties.  
 Applying Boyd’s HPC theory, Kendler, Zachar, and Craver (2011) argue that natural 
kinds in psychiatry are best understood as mechanistic property cluster (MPC) kinds: kinds that 
are constituted by networks of  biological mechanisms at multiple levels (e.g., molecular, 
developmental, neurobiological) that interact to produce the key features of the kind.7 An 
important feature of the MPC view of natural kinds is that it can explain the ‘projectability’ of 
natural kind terms (t)—i.e., it can account for how successful inferences about members of a 
kind can be made on the basis of induction—which is a fundamental aim of any satisfactory 
account of natural kinds (see Boyd, 1985, 2010; Goodman, 1983; Quine, 1969). It is the shared 
causal structure captured by a natural kind term (t) that allows for successful inductive inferences 
about members of a kind. In the case of mental disorders that are MPC kinds, this importantly 
includes inferences regarding the prognosis of a particular disorder and predictions concerning 
how an individual diagnosed with a disorder will respond to specific treatment interventions. 
Moreover, the shared causal structure of mental disorders that are MPC kinds can also account 
for the relative stability of such kinds over time. Because the characteristic signs of MPC kinds 
are constituted by stable (‘homeostatic’) networks of biological mechanisms, MPC kinds are 
stable objects of classification. 
Some mental disorders are suitable examples of MPC kinds because there are good 
reasons for thinking that their characteristic signs are underwritten by a set of stable biological 
mechanisms. For instance, some forms of mental retardation (e.g., Down syndrome) are known 
to be caused by a specific chromosomal abnormality (e.g., trisomy on chromosome 21), which 
causes predictable biological changes that impair the normal development of the brain (Gardner 
& Sutherland, 2004, ch. 16). There are also good reasons for regarding other mental disorders as 
MPC kinds constituted primarily by neurobiological mechanisms. For example, the psychotic 
(‘positive’) symptoms of schizophrenia (i.e., delusions, hallucinations, and thought disorder) are 
known to be caused by specific neurobiological mechanisms, such as excessive dopamine 
activity in the mesolimbic pathway (Tsou, 2012). In these examples, there is a distinctive 
biological causal structure associated with MPC kinds. By contrast, other mental disorders (e.g., 
hysteria, drapetomania, mathematics disorder, narcissistic personality disorder) are artificial 
kinds because the characteristic signs associated with these classifications are constituted 
primarily through social mechanisms (e.g., labeling, role adoption) and these disorders lack a 




                                                          
7 In this article, I assume that mechanisms are complex systems of entities and activities that are organized in a way 
to produce regular changes (see Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Craver & Darden, 2001; Glennan, 1996, 2002; 
Machamer, 2004; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; Tabery, 2004).  
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3. Are depression and suicide natural kinds? 
In the following section, I argue that depression and suicide are natural kinds insofar as 
they are classes of (abnormal) behavior that are underwritten by stable neurobiological 
mechanisms. In articulating this argument, I presuppose a diathesis-stress model wherein 
individuals may inherit a neurobiological vulnerability to depression and suicide (Mann et al., 
1999). In this model, individuals who inherit a susceptibility (diathesis) to depression and suicide 
are more likely to exhibit depressed symptoms or suicidal behavior in response to stress. Hence, 
my argument can be understood as the claim that there is an inherited vulnerability to depression 
and suicide that is identifiable at the neurobiological level. While research indicates that the 
expression of depression and suicide is mediated by social factors, this does not vitiate the fact 
that they are natural (i.e., mechanistic cluster property) kinds.  
In discussing depression and suicide as natural kinds, it should be stated at the outset that 
depression and suicide are different kinds of kinds. Depression is a mental disorder, while suicide 
is a behavior that is caused by depression. Accordingly, the kind of suicide examined in this 
article is limited to suicidal behavior (or suicide ideation) that results from major depression. The 
analysis of this article is not intended to apply to other kinds of suicide, such as suicide that is 
committed out of a sense of duty (see Cholbi, 2011, 2012).  
 
3.1. The biological basis of depression  
Depression (major depressive disorder) is classified in DSM-IV-TR as a mood disorder, 
and it is characterized by profound feelings of sadness and an inability to experience pleasure 
(APA, 2000, pp. 369-382). Other characteristic signs of depression include fatigue, low energy, 
physical aches, sleep disturbances, loss of appetite, low sex drive, and lack of initiative. To 
receive a diagnosis of major depressive disorder in DSM-IV-TR, the following criteria must be 
present for at least two weeks (APA, 2000, pp. 356, 375-376): 
A. Depressed mood (e.g., feelings of sadness or emptiness) or loss of pleasure in usual 
activities  
 
B. At least four of the following symptoms must be present nearly every day:  
 
(1) significant weight changes or changes in appetite  
(2) insomnia or hypersomnia 
(3) psychomotor agitation or retardation 
(4) fatigue or loss of energy  
(5) feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt  
(6) diminished concentration or indecisiveness 
(7) recurrent thoughts of suicide, suicide ideation, or a suicide attempt  
C. There is impairment in social or occupational functioning 
 
Individuals who are clinically depressed are at serious risk for suicide. It has been estimated that 
15.9% of people with unipolar depression and 29.2% of people with bipolar disorder attempt to 
commit suicide (Chen & Dilsaver, 1996). 
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Evidence that depression is a natural kind comes from multiple lines of research. 
Depression is observed in all cultures, although there is variability in the ways in which it is 
expressed across cultures (Kleinman, 1977, 1988, ch. 3; Kleinman & Good, 1985). Major 
depression afflicts women two to three times more than men (Carlson, 2008, p. 471), and it is 
three times as common among low socioeconomic status groups (Kessler et al., 2003). Compared 
to disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder—which are associated with lifetime 
prevalence rates around 1% —prevalence rates of depression are significantly higher and show 
greater variability across cultures (Ingram, Scott, & Hamill, 2009, pp. 232-233; Weissman et al., 
2010). Lifetime prevalence rates of depression have been estimated to be 4.9%  by the 
Epidemiological Catchment Area study (Freedman, 1984) and 17.1% by the National 
Comorbidity Survey (Kessler et al., 1994), making depression one of the most common mental 
disorders. In a cross-cultural study of depression conducted by the World Health Organization, a 
number of common symptoms were found among three quarters of depressed patients from 
countries across the world: sadness, joylessness, anxiety, tension, lack of energy, decreased 
interest and concentration, feelings of inadequacy, and feelings of worthlessness (Sartorius et al., 
1983, p. 92). This finding is important as it suggests that there is a ‘core’ cluster of symptoms 
associated with depression.  
Genetic research supports the view that depression is partly heritable. Twin studies have 
yielded heritability estimates of 37% for major depressive disorder (Kendler & Prescott, 1999; 
Sullivan, Neale, & Kendler, 2000), and these estimates are higher when samples are taken from 
more severe inpatient populations (Kring et al. 2007, pp. 237-238). Studies on specific genetic 
regions have identified polymorphisms in the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR), which is 
theorized to interact with environmental factors to increase the risk of depression (Ogilvie et al., 
1996; Risch et al., 2009). 
The most convincing evidence that depression is a natural kind comes from research on 
the neurobiology of depression. According to the ‘monoamine hypothesis’ (Carlson, 2008, pp. 
476-477; Delgado 2000; Hirschfeld 2000; McKim, 2007, pp. 303-306; Owens 2004), depression 
is caused by deficient activity of monoamine neurotransmitters: norepinephrine (NE), serotonin 
(5-HT), and dopamine (DA). Evidence for the monoamine hypothesis comes from research on 
pharmacological interventions with depressed patients.8 Antidepressant drugs (e.g., MAO 
inhibitors, tricyclic antidepressants, specific serotonin reuptake inhibitors) that can relieve the 
signs of depression are all monoamine agonists that increase the activity of monoamine 
neurotransmitters. This hypothesis also receives support from the finding that monoamine 
antagonist drugs with opposite pharmacological effects as antidepressants (e.g., reserpine) can 
induce depressive symptoms in non-depressed individuals (Sachar & Baron, 1979). Research has 
indicated that antidepressants exert their influence primarily on serotonin and norepinephrine 
                                                          
8 I have elsewhere discussed the role of pharmacological drugs as experimental instruments that can help researchers 
identify the neurobiological causes of mental disorders (Tsou, 2012). In the context of neurobiological research, 
pharmacological drugs function as tools that enable researchers to access and detect the existence of stable 
neurobiological kinds. In this article, I assume that antidepressant drugs and other pharmacological drugs are 
experimental instruments that have aided in the identification of depression as a stable neurobiological kind. For a 
more comprehensive historical discussion of the discovery and evolution of antidepressant drugs—and their role in 
facilitating the formulation of neurobiological theories of depression—see Fangmann et al. (2008), Healy (1997), 
López-Muñoz & Alamo (2009), and López-Muñoz et al. (2007). 
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systems (since dopamine agonists such as amphetamines do not have an antidepressant effect), 
with serotonin specifically implicated (Maes & Meltzer, 1995; Meltzer & Lowy, 1987).  
 The monoamine hypothesis is limited insofar as absolute levels of neurotransmitters 
cannot tell the complete story about depression. Some important experimental findings in this 
connection are: (1) treating depression with pharmacological drugs takes one or two weeks, 
however, by this time, neurotransmitter levels have returned to their initial levels, and (2) 
metabolic studies have shown that some individuals with depression do not show evidence of 
abnormal absolute neurotransmitter levels (Kring et al. 2007, p. 239). In response to these 
findings, researchers have investigated the sensitivity of 5-HT receptors, and this research 
suggests that the diminished serotonin activity associated with depression is the result of 
insensitive 5-HT receptors. This view is supported by experiments utilizing trypotophan 
depletion methods (Delgado et al., 1990), in which researchers lower serotonin levels by 
depleting levels of tryptophan (which is the major precursor to serotonin) with a drink containing 
high levels of 15 amino acids and no tryptophan. Studies have demonstrated that depleting 
tryptophan (thereby lowering serotonin levels) causes temporary depressive symptoms among 
individuals with a history of depression, but not for individuals with no history of depression 
(Benkelfat et al., 1994; Johnson et al., 2009, pp. 203-204; Moore at al., 2000). This research 
suggests that individuals who have a vulnerability to depression have insensitive serotonin 
receptors. 
 Brain-imaging studies suggest that the main brain structures involved in depression are 
the amygdala, anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus (Kring et al., 2007, pp. 
240-242). Functional activation studies indicate that major depression is associated with elevated 
activity in the amygdala and diminished activity in the anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and 
hippocampus (Johnson et al., 2009, pp. 211-215). One theory, which is of particular relevance 
for the analysis of this article, suggests that depressed patients show greater emotional reactivity 
due to overactivity in the amygdala, but decreased ability to plan due to diminished activity in 
the anterior cingulate, prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus (Davidson et al., 2002). This follows 
from the premise that the amygdala is involved in assigning emotional significance to stimuli, 
while the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, and hippocampus are structures involved in 
weighing rewards and costs, making decisions, and pursuing goals (Kring et al., 2007, p. 240-
241). One study using PET scans found that individuals with depression or a history of 
depression (compared to individuals without current or previous depression) showed less activity 
in the orbitofrontal cortex (in the prefrontal cortex) after being induced into a sad state (Liotti et 
al., 2002). This indicates that as people with current depression become sad, they present less 
activity in brain areas implicated in planning and executing plans.  
 Neuroendocrinological studies on depressed individuals have also revealed abnormalities 
in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, which is the biological system that manages 
stress (Johnson et al., 2009, pp. 206-211; Kring et al., 2007, pp. 242-244). This research indicates 
that depression is associated with hyperactivity of the HPA axis and elevated levels of cortisol, 
which is a hormone that is released in response to stress (Nestler et al., 2002). Chronic activation 
of the HPA axis—which results in high levels of cortisol—can disrupt functioning in brain 
regions responsible for regulating mood (e.g., the hippocampus, prefrontal cortex, amygdala) as 
well as serotonin systems (Johnson et al., 2009, pp. 207-211). Thus, it is likely that depression 
involves a complex interaction between mechanisms involved in neuroendocrine responses (i.e., 
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the HPA axis) and neurobiological mechanisms (e.g., serotonin systems), which can affect other 
brain regions (Nestler et al., 2002).   
 
3.2. The biological basis of suicide 
The question of whether suicide is a natural kind is an issue concerning whether suicide 
is best understood as a medical or social phenomenon. Within the theoretical framework of this 
article, this issue can be reduced to the question of whether there are stable and predictable 
biological mechanisms associated with suicide and suicide ideation. In what follows, I argue that 
suicide is a natural kind insofar as it is a class of abnormal behavior underwritten by a stable set 
of neurobiological mechanisms. In articulating this argument, I assume that depression is the 
major cause of suicide ideation and that there are mechanisms common to both depression and 
suicide; however, some evidence suggests that suicide has a biological basis that may—in part—
be distinct from depression. 
As many as 90% of individuals who commit suicide are suffering from some mental 
disorder (Mann, 1998, p. 25). Researchers have estimated that more than half the individuals 
who commit suicide are depressed (Henriksson et al., 1993), and suicides are most likely when 
an individual is experiencing depression (Angst et al., 2002; Linehan, 1997). Whereas the 
prevalence of depression is greater for women than for men, men are four times more likely than 
women to commit suicide (Arias et al., 2003). Psychological research has indicated that two of 
the best predictors for suicide attempts are problem-solving deficits (Dieserud et al., 2003; Keilp 
et al., 2001; Linehan & Shearin, 1988) and hopelessness (Beck, Kovacs, & Weissman, 1975; 
Brown et al., 2000; Weishaar & Beck, 1992). 
Multiple lines of research indicate that suicide is associated with a distinctive biological 
causal structure. Genetic studies suggest that suicide risk is partly heritable. Adoption and family 
studies have indicated that there is a genetic contribution to suicidal behavior that is independent 
of the heritability of other major psychiatric disorders (Brent et al., 1996; Egeland & Sussex, 
1985; Roy, 1986; Roy et al., 1991; Schulsinger et al., 1979). Twin studies have found that 
monozygotic (MZ) twins have a significantly higher concordance for suicide than dizygotic (DZ) 
twins (Roy, 1993; Roy, Segal, & Sarchiapone, 1995; Statham et al., 1998).  
The most convincing evidence that suicide is linked with distinctive biological 
mechanisms comes from research on the neurobiology of suicide. Just as deficient serotonin 
activity is implicated in depression, suicide appears to be related to low activity of serotonin. 
One line of research supporting this inference draws on the fact that lower production and release 
of serotonin in the brain is correlated with decreased Cerebrospinal Fluid (CSF) levels of 5-
HIAA (5-hydroxindoleacetic acid). Studies have found that CSF levels of 5-HIAA are 
significantly lower among individuals who have attempted suicide compared to controls and that 
lower levels of 5-HIAA are correlated with higher number of suicide attempts (Åsberg, 
Träskmann, & Thorén, 1976; Roy, De Jong, & Linnoila, 1989; Träskmann et al., 1981). Low 
CSF levels of 5-HIAA have also been reported in suicides with patients with schizophrenia and 
personality disorders, which suggests that the association between 5-HIAA and suicide may be 
independent of depression (Mann et al., 2001). Post-mortem studies have found increased 
numbers of postsynaptic serotonin receptors (e.g., 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A receptors) in the 
prefrontal cortex of suicide victims, possibly due to a compensatory response to reduced 
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serotonin activity (Mann, 1998, p. 26). While depression is associated with hyperactivity of the 
HPA axis, evidence suggests that suicide victims exhibit even greater hyperactivity (Bunney et 
al., 1969; Nemeroff et al., 1988). 
  
3.3. How do social factors affect depression and suicide?  
As discussed in section 2.1 of this article, theorists such as Szasz and Hacking appeal to 
social factors in their arguments against the existence of natural kinds in psychiatry. Evidence 
suggests that social factors play a strong role in the expression of depression and suicide; 
however, these social factors do not vitiate the fact that depression and suicide are natural kinds 
constituted by stable biological mechanisms. 
The research reviewed above indicates that depression and suicide are natural kinds 
associated with a common neurobiological causal structure. The fact that there is a ‘common 
core’ of symptoms associated with depression (i.e., sadness, joylessness, anxiety, tension, lack of 
energy, decreased interest and concentration, feelings of inadequacy, and feelings of 
worthlessness) that is observed across cultures indicates that depression is a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, rather than a purely social phenomenon. Moreover, experimental interventions 
with depressed patients using pharmacological drugs provide clues about the neurobiological 
causes of depression. The evidence reviewed supports the inference that there are distinctive and 
stable neurobiological mechanisms that underwrite the characteristic signs of depression and 
suicide (e.g., diminished serotonin activity due to insensitive 5-HT receptors). 
A consideration of cross-cultural research on psychopathology clarifies the sense in 
which some mental disorder are ‘more natural’ than others. This research indicates that both 
schizophrenia and depression are ubiquitous in all cultures; however, there is greater variability 
in the ways in which depression is expressed across cultures compared to schizophrenia, e.g., in 
non-Western cultures depressive signs are expressed more in terms of somatic complaints 
(Kleinman, 1977, 1988, ch. 3; Kleinman & Good, 1985). One way to interpret these findings is 
to regard the uniformity of the expression of a disorder across cultures as a measure of the extent 
that a disorder is biologically determined (Tsou, 2007). This implies that some mental disorders 
that are constituted by stable biological mechanisms (e.g., Down syndrome, schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder) are ‘more natural’ than other disorders because their stereotypical cluster of 
signs are more directly the result of biological mechanisms. This stance captures the intuition 
that the most natural kinds of mental disorders are biologically determined disorders, whose 
characteristic signs (or cluster of co-occurring properties) are directly determined by biological 
causes. By contrast, less biologically determined disorders lie at the ‘more artificial’ end of the 
classification spectrum because the expression of these disorders is more strongly mediated by 
social and cultural factors (and hence, looping effects); for this reason, one would expect to see 
greater variability in the cluster of co-occurring properties associated with such disorders. At the 
same time, it is important to reiterate that it is precisely the shared biological basis of these 
disorders that renders them mechanistic property cluster kinds. Conversely, purely socially 
constituted disorders (e.g., hysteria, narcissistic personality disorder, mathematics disorder) 
without a distinctive biological structure are not natural kinds and can be regarded as artificial 
classes of abnormal behavior. 
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  In this article, I assume that depression and suicide are influenced by social factors 
insofar as the expression of these conditions will be mediated by social and cultural factors. It is 
important to note, however, that this social mediation does not negate the fact that depression 
and suicide are natural kinds constituted by stable biological mechanisms. While the expression 
of a disorder may, due to social factors, vary both within and across cultures, I assume that there 
is a core cluster of properties (viz., the characteristic signs that are constituted by biological 
mechanisms) that will be common across different cultures and remain stable over time. This 
framework provides reasons to resist the conclusions reached by Szasz and Hacking. With 
respect to Szasz’s argument, the fact that mental disorders (and medical disorders more 
generally) require evaluations that make reference to social norms does not preclude the 
possibility that mental disorders are underwritten by stable biological mechanisms. With respect 
to Hacking’s argument, the fact that psychiatric classifications have feedback effects on the kinds 
of people being classified does not invalidate the possibility that the objects being classified refer 
to stable MPC kinds.9 Mental disorders that are natural kinds will remain stable in spite of 
looping effects because these disorders are constituted by a stable set of biological mechanisms.  
 
4. Implications for physician-assisted suicide 
Issues regarding the naturalness of depression and suicide are highly relevant for assisted 
suicide. In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the fact that depression is a natural kind is 
significant because it is precisely the natural (i.e., biological) basis of depression that allows 
physicians to make projectable inferences about patients who are considering assisted suicide. As 
discussed in the second section of this article, natural kind terms (e.g., ‘depression,’ 
‘schizophrenia’) are projectable insofar as judgments about a member of a kind can be reliably 
extended to other members on the basis of induction. For mechanistic property cluster kinds such 
as depression, the projectability of natural kind terms is explained by the fact that there is a 
predictable biological causal structure shared by members of a kind. From this perspective, 
physicians can make reliable inductive inferences and predictions about disorders that are 
mechanistic property cluster kinds because members of these kinds are all constituted by a set of 
similar biological mechanisms. 
Research indicates that a significant number of individuals seeking physician-assisted 
suicide or euthanasia are clinically depressed (Back et al., 1996; Ganzini, Goy, & Dobscha, 
2008; Lavery et al., 2001; van der Lee et al., 2005) and that desire for hastened death is 
significantly associated with a diagnosis of major depression (Breitbart et al., 2000; Breitbart, 
Rosenfeld, & Passik, 1996; Chochinov et al., 1995; Kelly et al., 2003; Rosenfeld, 2000). In a 
meta-analysis of existing studies on the prevalence of depression in cases of assisted suicide, the 
authors concluded that around 25-50% of patients who have made requests for assisted suicide 
showed signs of depression and 2-10% of patients who have received physician-assisted suicide 
                                                          
9 Hacking argues that suicide is not a natural kind and that the modern (medical) concept of suicide is a product of 
interactions between the statistical and medical sciences that began in the early nineteenth century (see Hacking, 
1986; 1990, ch. 8; 1995; 2007a). Contra-Hacking, I want to suggest that suicide is a stable neurobiological kind and 
that various attempts to study it (and different meanings that have been attached to it) have not fundamentally 
changed the neurobiological nature of suicide.  
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were depressed (Levene & Parker, 2011). In a review of empirical studies on assisted suicide, 
Rosenfeld (2000) concluded that depression and other psychosocial factors (e.g., lack of social 
support) are significant contributing factors in determining an individual’s desire for hastened 
death, and they appear to have a stronger causal influence than physical symptoms (e.g., pain).    
 
4.1. Does depression compromise decision-making? 
A crucial, yet poorly understood, question that is relevant for assisted suicide is whether 
depression compromises or otherwise hampers an individual’s capacity to make competent 
decisions regarding ending his or her life. In what follows, I examine empirical evidence that the 
biological mechanisms implicated in depression (i.e., disturbances in serotonin systems) can 
hinder an individual’s capacity to make competent decisions. Some studies have indicated that 
the decision-making capacity of depressed patients who have a history of suicide attempts is 
impaired compared to depressed patients who have not attempted suicide. This finding suggests 
that there may be high risk for decision-making deficits among depressed individuals who have a 
desire for hastened death or who are seeking physician-assisted suicide. I review some of these 
studies, focusing on the specific ways in which decision-making is compromised among 
individuals with depression. 
Individuals with depression suffer cognitive impairments, especially on tasks of executive 
functioning, i.e., tasks related to problem solving, planning, and the initiation of behaviors 
(Austin et al., 1992; Degl’Innocenti, Ågren, & Backman 1998; Fossati, Ergis, & Allilaire, 2002; 
Goodwin, 1997; Martin, Oren, & Boone, 1991; Powell & Miklowitz, 1994; Veiel, 1997). For the 
purposes of this article, this finding is important since decision-making—such as the decision to 
end one’s life—is a task of executive functioning. Given that individuals with depression show 
cognitive deficits in executive functions, there is prima facie reason to think that they are less 
likely to make competent decisions regarding ending their lives. Tasks of executive functioning 
are primarily carried out in the prefrontal areas of the frontal lobe, and brain imaging and post-
mortem studies with patients with major depression have found alterations in multiple areas of 
the prefrontal cortex, especially in the left dorsolateral prefrontal region (Kring et al., 2007, pp. 
240-241; Marzuk et al., 2005, p. 295). Thus, empirical research supports the idea that the 
decision-making capacity among individuals with depression is compromised. 
Cognitive rigidity has been theorized to be a specific impairment of executive functioning 
among suicidal individuals that may influence decisions concerning suicide (Keilp et al., 2001; 
Marzuk et al., 2005). Cognitive rigidity is a tendency towards dichotomous (all or nothing) 
thinking and cognitive inflexibility that makes it difficult for individuals to formulate alternative 
solutions to problems (Patsiokas, Clum & Luscomb, 1979). Individuals who are cognitively rigid 
have a tendency to conceptualize their problems in dichotomous terms such as ‘good or bad,’ 
‘right or wrong,’ etc. (Marzuk et al., 2005). This impairment is also characterized by an inability 
to identify problems and associated solutions (Schotte & Clum, 1987). A number of studies have 
found that depressed individuals who have contemplated or attempted suicide are cognitively 
rigid (see Luscomb, Clum, & Patsiokas, 1980; Neuringer, 1961, 1964; Patsiokas, Clum, & 
Luscomb, 1979; Pollock & Williams, 1998; Schotte & Clum, 1987). One study found that, 
compared to depressed non-suicidal patients, depressed patients who had current suicide ideation 
performed significantly worse on several measures of executive functioning, including measures 
of executive functioning involving mental flexibility (Marzuk et al., 2005). Theoretical models 
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of suicide that have attempted to relate problem-solving deficits to hopelessness have indicated 
that cognitive rigidity may be a cognitive trait that is concomitant to—rather than a cause of—
depression, hopelessness, and suicide ideation (Weishaar, 1996, pp. 240-242). Moreover, there is 
evidence that cognitive rigidity is a transient characteristic (rather than an enduring trait) of 
suicide attempters (Perrah & Wichman, 1987). Regardless of how the relationship among 
depression, cognitive rigidity, hopelessness, and suicide ideation is theorized (e.g., see 
McLeavey et al., 1987; Rickelman & Houfek, 1995; Schotte & Clum, 1987; Weishaar & Beck, 
1992), research suggests that cognitive rigidity is a specific cognitive impairment among 
depressed patients who are contemplating suicide. 
The decision-making impairment (i.e., cognitive rigidity) associated with suicidal patients 
is related to biological mechanisms that are known to be implicated in both depression and 
suicide. As discussed above, patients with depression present cognitive deficits in executive 
functions, which are known to be associated with dysfunction in the prefrontal cortex. An area of 
the prefrontal cortex of particular relevance is the orbitofrontal cortex. Lesion and functional 
imaging studies indicate that the orbitofrontal cortex is crucial for decision-making and that 
damage in this region leads to high-risk and disadvantageous decisions in real life (Damasio et 
al., 1994; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985). A specific serotonin dysfunction that has been implicated 
in depressed patients with a history of suicide is serotonin projections to the orbitofrontal cortex 
and the brainstem (Mann, 1998). Hence, multiple lines of research suggest that cognitive rigidity 
can be usefully conceptualized—at the neurobiological level—in terms of a deficit of 
serotonergic projections to the orbitofrontal cortex, which contribute significantly to suicidal 
ideation (Jollant et al., 2005).  
 
4.2. Depression, decision-making, and assisted suicide 
Given that there are predictable impairments in decision-making among some depressed 
patients with a desire for hastened death, what bearing does this fact have for the issue of assisted 
suicide? In addressing this question, several qualifications should be made at the outset. First, 
studies on cognitive rigidity involve samples of clinically depressed patients who may differ in 
important respects from the groups of patients seeking physician-assisted suicide. Second, it is 
unclear precisely how the cognitive deficits in decision-making discussed above apply to end-of-
life decisions, although there are reasons for thinking that the cognitive rigidity, hopelessness, 
and negative outlook associated with depression incline patients in the direction of suicide. 
Finally, the presence of depression does not necessarily preclude the possibility that an 
individual seeking assisted suicide can make a rational and competent decision (Rosenfeld, 2000, 
p. 481). 
 In the context of assisted suicide, the analysis of this article suggests that when patients 
present signs of depression: (i) special efforts should be made to assess the decision-making 
competency of the patient and (ii) efforts should be made to treat the depression. Five heuristic 
strategies that should be followed by physicians when a patient requests physician-assisted 
suicide or euthanasia are (Rosenblatt & Block, 2001, p. 320): 
(1) The patient’s reasons for their request should be clarified 




(3) The patient’s request should be reassessed after psychological and social distress have 
been treated 
(4) The physician-patient relationship should be assessed 
(5) The patient’s decision-making capacity should be assessed 
The analysis of this article has implications primarily for (5) and (3). With respect to (5), 
cognitive rigidity is a specific deficit related to decision making that clinicians should take into 
consideration. With respect to (3), there are known pharmacological and cognitive interventions 
for depressed patients who are suicidal. 
The primary conclusion drawn in this article pertains to (5): when a patient show signs of 
depression, his or her decision-making capacity should be properly evaluated by a mental health 
professional to ensure that the patient is presenting good reasons for requesting physician-
assisted suicide. Judgments regarding whether a patient is cognitively rigid should be assessed 
(e.g., using tools such as the Iowa Gambling Task, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, or the Trail 
Making Test), since this trait may be impairing a patient’s capacity to make a competent decision 
about ending his or her life. Moreover, different ways in which a patient’s depression might 
negatively affect their decision-making process should be openly discussed with the patient 
(Rosenblatt & Block, 2001). In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the crucial components 
of decision-making capacity include being capable of communicating a voluntary decision, 
having the capacity to reason and deliberate about the information, and holding a stable set of 
values (Rosenblatt & Block, 2001, p. 324). Among these variables, there is evidence that the 
capacity to reason and deliberate about information is compromised by the potential cognitive 
rigidity presented by a patient.    
 A secondary conclusion of this article pertains to (3): when patients show signs of 
depression, efforts should be made to treat the depression before granting a request for assisted 
suicide. Questions concerning the efficacy of treatments for depression are controversial. 
Double-blind studies have indicated that antidepressant medications are effective for treating 
depressive disorders and that 50-70% of patients receiving antidepressants show some 
improvement (Depression Guideline Panel, 1993). Other studies indicate that psychotherapy 
(i.e., cognitive behavioral therapy, interpersonal psychotherapy) have comparable benefits to 
antidepressant treatment (Elkin et al., 1989). Generally, findings suggest that prescribing 
antidepressants or psychotherapy for depression will only have modest benefits for depressed 
patients; however, treatment will be most beneficial for patients who have more severe forms of 
depression (Elkin et al., 1989; Elkin et al., 1995; Kirsch et al., 2008; Sotsky et al., 1991). For the 
most severe forms of depression, there is limited evidence that antidepressants are superior to 
psychotherapy (Cuijpers et al., 2008; Imel et al., 2008). With respect to suicidal populations, 
some community studies have estimated that medications for mood disorders reduce the risk of 
suicide by three or four times (Angst et al., 2002), and some studies suggest that selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors are superior for producing a rapid alleviation of suicidal symptoms 
(Kapur, Mieczkowski, & Mann, 1992). In cases where a patient exhibits problem-solving deficits 
or signs of cognitive rigidity, psychological interventions that target these deficits (e.g., problem-
solving training, cognitive shift training, interventions that promote cognitive flexibility) may be 
warranted. This recommendation is especially salient given that there is some evidence that 
cognitive behavioral interventions that focus on problem-solving are highly effective at reducing 





 In this article, I argued that depression and suicide are natural kinds insofar as they are 
classes constituted by distinct neurobiological mechanisms, e.g., deficient serotonin activity due 
to insensitive 5-HT receptors. The significance of this argument is that the natural (biological) 
basis of these classes allows for projectable inferences to be made about members of a kind. In 
the context of assisted suicide, inferences concerning the decision-making competence of 
depressed patients considering assisted suicide are extremely important. I reviewed evidence that 
some depressed patients who are suicidal present deficits in tasks of executive functioning 
(cognitive rigidity) and that this impairment in decision-making is associated with deficient 
serotonin projections to the orbitofrontal cortex. This suggests that special attention should be 
paid to the decision-making competence of depressed patients requesting physician-assisted 
suicide. 
The analysis of this article has further implications for psychiatric classification, research 
on suicide ideation, and treatment interventions for suicidal individuals. At present, the 
diagnostic criteria for major depression do not include problem-solving deficits. As discussed in 
this article, general problem-solving deficits due to failures of executive functioning (expressed 
in patients as cognitive rigidity) is a strong predictor for suicide ideation among depressed 
patients. Hence, there are good theoretical reasons for including problem-solving deficits or 
mental inflexibility among the criteria required for a DSM diagnosis of depression (especially for 
more severe forms of depression). With respect to research on suicide ideation, more efforts 
should be directed towards understanding the complex interactions among cognitive rigidity, 
hopelessness, and negative outlook. Research on the biological bases of these cognitive traits 
could potentially clarify the causal basis of suicide ideation. Finally, given the considerable role 
that cognitive rigidity appears to play in suicide ideation, more efforts should be made to 
understand precisely how this particular cognitive trait contributes to suicide ideation and to 
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